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This article analyzes recent attempts by the United States govern-
ment to restrict the release of scientific and technical information-
in particular research conducted under the auspices of universi-
ties- to foreign nationals. Until quite recently, the government's
virtually exclusive instrument for restricting transfers of information
was classification. On grounds of national security, certain informa-
tion was classified as secret, to be revealed only to a comparatively
small group of people, those with "clearance" and a "need to
know."
Rules specifying the types of information that can be classified,
and those with authority to do so, have been embodied in various
executive orders. The current Executive Order on National Security
Information, issued by President Reagan in 1982, classifies informa-
tion only if "its unauthorized disclosure, either by itself or in the
context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to national security."' The categories of information that
may be classified under Reagan's executive order include "scientific,
technological or economic matters...."2 The order, however,
also explicitly states that "[b]asic scientific information not clearly
related to the national security may not be classified." 3
The Reagan executive order, like previous executive orders, per-
tains to "any information or material, regardless of its physical form
or characteristics, that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under
the control of the United States Government."4 The criteria for
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has been published in the proceedings of that Conference at 33, available from the
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1. Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.3(b), 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Reagan Exec. Order].
2. Id. § 1.3(a)(6).
3. Id. § 1.6(b).
4. Id. § 6.1(b).
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classification in the Reagan executive order, however, differ from
previous orders in several important ways. Under the Carter execu-
tive order, 5 for example, information could be classified only if it
"reasonably could be expected to cause identifiable damage to the
national security." The requirement that damage to the national se-
curity be identifiable seemingly made classification under the Carter
standard considerably more difficult than it is under the current
Reagan executive order.6 In contrast, the Eisenhower executive or-
der permitted classification merely if it "could be prejudicial to the
defense interests of the nation." 7
It may seem curious that the President can issue without congres-
sional approval an executive order that drastically broadens the
range of classifiable information. Legal scholars appear to agree
that executive orders on classification lie within presidential power.8
Presumably, this power is constrained by the First Amendment, but
there is no legal precedent which indicates that President Reagan's
imposition of controls on information which "reasonably might be
expected to cause damage to national security" violates the First
Amendment. The meaning of "national security," moreover, is far
from clear. The Reagan executive order gives a rather uninstructive
definition: "National security means the national defense or foreign
relations of the United States." 9
Executive orders are not the only basis for classifying information
under United States law. For instance, under the Invention Secrecy
Act, ' a patent whose disclosure "would be detrimental to the na-
tional security" can be classified on a renewable year-to-year basis;
5. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 C.F.R. 190 (1978).
6. See Halperin and Adler, Re: Draft Executive Order on National Security, (Feb. 9,
1982) (memorandum released by the Center for National Security Studies). However,
an analysis by the Information Security Oversight Office, which administers the govern-
ment's classification program, distributed March 19, 1982, by the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Science and Technology, states: "Tlhe term 'identifiable' has
been omitted. . .to overcome litigation problems concerning the intent of the language
of E.O. 12065. It is not intended nor does experience indicate that its omission will
result in information being classified. . .which would not be classifiable under E.O.
12065."
7. Exec. Order No. 10,501, 18 Fed Reg. 7049 (1953); Halperin and Adler, supra note
6; Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 1, § 6.1(b).
8. The phrase "appear to agree" is used advisedly. It is difficult to find unequivocal
assertions about the legal underpinnings for classification by the Executive. For useful
discussions and other references to the relevant scholarly literature, see Cheh, Government
Control of Private Ideas - Striking a Balance Between Scientific Freedom and National Security, 23
JURIMErRIcsJ. 1, 15-17 (1982); Greenstein, Federal Contractors and Grantees: What Are Your
First Amendment Rights?, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 197, 201-4 (1984).
9. Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 1, § 6.1(e).




some patents have been kept secret for over 30 years.'' Under the
Reagan executive order or the Invention Secrecy Act, information
can become classified only by the conscious act of an authorized offi-
cial, but some information can become classified without anyone's
action. For example, under the Atomic Energy Act,' 2 almost all in-
formation related to nuclear energy and nuclear weapons is consid-
ered to be "born classified."' 3 In the Progressive case,'14 a federal
district court judge relied on the Atomic Energy Act to enjoin publi-
cation of a magazine article describing the workings of a hydrogen
bomb, even though the article was based solely on information, such
as encyclopedia articles, that was in the public domain.
Usually, information is classifiable only if its release reasonably
could be expected to damage national security interests. Given the
classification process, it would seem that the release of unclassified
information, whether to United States citizens or to foreigners,
would be legally permissible. The control of information transfers,
however, is not limited to classified information. In recent years,
restrictions on the transfer of unclassified information have in-
creased. For example, from 1981 through 1983, the Department of
Energy ("DOE") limited the distribution of about 7% of the unclas-
sified documents it issued.' 5 The DOE claims authority to control
its unclassified information under a section of the Atomic Energy
Act' 6 that permits the Secretary of Energy to limit the distribution
of documents that may have "a significant adverse effect" on either
11. These assertions about the Invention Secrecy Act have been taken from Cheh,
supra note 8, at 12.
12. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2296 (West 1973 and Supp. 1985).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1982). "Information in this category is [said to be] 'born clas-
sified,' i.e., it is subject to official secrecy protection from the moment of its creation,
regardless of where located, and can be removed from its privileged status only by af-
firmative determination of the government." Relyea, National Security Controls and
Scientific Information, Library of Congress Congressional Research Service (June
13,1983).
14. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wisc. 1979), app. dis-
missed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
15. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ACTIVITIES To
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN UNCLASSIFIED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION,
2-3 (1984) (indexed as GAO/RCED-84-129) [hereinafter cited as DOE REPORT]. For
further details concerning this DOE practice, and the objections thereto, see 36 PHYSICS
TODAY 43 (1983) and Norman, Universities Denounce DOE's Secrecy Rules, 221 SCIENCE 932
(1983). Of course, we are concerned here only with information whose release has been
withheld for national security reasons even though the information has not been classi-
fied. The government customarily withholds unclassified information for a variety of
generally well accepted reasons, wholly unrelated to national security, e.g., proprietary
information, census and income tax data about named individuals, the identities ofjuve-
nile malfeasors, etc.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2168 (1982).
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the public health and safety or the national defense and security.17
The DOE has admitted that, in general, the "significant adverse ef-
fect" standard enables restrictions on the distribution of informa-
tion which would not be classifiable under the Reagan executive
order. 18
I. Export Control Statutes and Regulations
The abovementioned mechanisms for restricting the transfer of
information all make information unavailable to foreign nationals
and United States citizens. Under the export controls embodied in
various federal statutes and regulations, however, only transfers of
information to foreign nationals are restricted. Nevertheless, export
controls provide the broadest and most pervasive means under
United States law for controlling the transfer of unclassified infor-
mation by United States citizens. Numerous statutes - for example
the Atomic Energy Act, the Trading With the Enemy Act, 19 the Con-
trolled Substances Import and Export Act, 20 and the Endangered
Species Act 21 - limit exports from the United States. Two such
statutes are particularly significant with respect to the transfer of in-
formation: The Export Administration Act of 1979 and its associ-
ated Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 22 and the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976 and its associated International Traffic
17. Id. § 2168(a)(2).
18. DOE REPORT, supra note 15.
19. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1983). Under this Act, essentially every variety of transaction
with the "enemy" is proscribed, including financial transactions and performing or en-
tering into contracts.
20. 21 U.S.C. § 951 (1983). The controlled substances are drugs, mainly but not
necessarily narcotic.
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1983).
22. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1983); 15 C.F.R. §§ 368.1-399.2 (1984). Actually, under
50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 as originally passed, the Export Administration Act was to expire
on October 1, 1983, but its provisions were continued under Executive Orders and Con-
gressional extensions while the House and Senate wrangled over their respective ver-
sions of a new bill. They finally managed to agree in mid-1985. We now have the
Export Administration Act of 1985 (signed by President Reagan on July 12, 1985) which
largely appears to continue the 1979 Export Act, but which has been passed too recently
for its ramifications to be really apparent. Nevertheless, the 1985 Act already is the
subject of a heavily advertised book and short courses. See Exec. Order No. 12,444, 48
Fed. Reg. 48,215 (1983), issued under the authority of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1983); Exec. Order No. 12,451, 48 Fed. Reg.
56,563 (1983); 130 CONG. REC. S14077-83 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984), and S14318-39,
S14535 and H12109-70 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984); N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1984, at D7, col.
4;J.R. LIEBMAN, R.H. MEYER & R.L. JoHNSON, EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1985); The Export Administration Act of 1985 and its Ramifications, sponsored by Legal Times,





in Arms Regulations (ITAR).23 The ITAR are administered by the
State Department. The EAR are administered by the Commerce De-
partment. In practice, potentially controversial export licenses are
not granted by these Departments without consultation with other
concerned government departments and agencies, such as the De-
partment of Defense. In addition, the United States government co-
ordinates its policies on the control of exports with those of other
NATO countries (without Iceland but with Japan) through a mul-
tinational coordination committee (COCOM).2 4
The Arms Export Control Act authorizes the President to control
the manufacture and export of "defense articles and defense serv-
ices." Items which the President designates as defense articles and
defense services constitute the United States Munitions list.25 The
export of listed items is controlled through a licensing system.2 6
The Export Administration Act authorizes the President to control
the export of goods and technical data to protect national security,
to conserve scarce goods and to further foreign policy objectives.
To carry out these statutory mandates, the Commerce Department
maintains the Commodity Control List, 27 which is also the basis for
an export licensing system.
The Export Administration Act is concerned with items which
have both civilian and military application ("dual use" items); the
Arms Export Control Act, by contrast, is concerned only with items
having solely military uses ("munitions"). Both of these export acts,
it should be stressed, apply to privately generated technical data.
23. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1983); 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.1-130.17 (1985).
24. COCOM was established in 1949 as a multilateral, consultative organization
charged with coordinating export controls for security purposes. It has compiled lists of
controlled exports to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact nations, Albania, North Korea,
Mongolia, Kampuchea, Vietnam, and China. COCOM reviews its list of controlled items
every three or four years. Mally, Technology Transfer Controls, 23JURIMETRICSJ. 33 (1982).
According to the BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONTROLLING TRANS-
FER OF STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY (1985), COCOM has no formal relationship with NATO,
and is not based on any treaty or executive agreement. Its use has increased during the
Reagan Administration; recently COCOM has been flooded with applications from busi-
nesses hoping to sell technology to China. Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1985, at A14, col. 1. 50
U.S.C. app. § 2404(i) (1983) directs the President to enter into negotiations with the
governments participating in COCOM in order to (1) publish a list of controlled items,
(2) hold periodic meetings to discuss export control policy issues, (3) reduce the level of
export controls to a level acceptable to and enforceable by all governments participating
in the Committee, and (4) develop more effective procedures for enforcing export
controls.
25. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1984).
26. Very recently the Department of Commerce, rather than the Department of
State, appears to have taken export control jurisdiction over the "defense articles" on
the Munitions List. 50 Fed. Reg. 3740 (1985).
27. 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1984).
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tn lTlilc the executive orders, application of the export acts is not lint-
ited to information "that is owned by, produced by or for, or is
tinder the control of the U.S. government."
It is generally accepted that the President should be able to con-
trol the export of munitions or of dual use goods that are likely to
be of military use to a hostile power. At first glance, therefore, there
is little reason to expect that either of these export acts would seri-
ously burden the kinds of scientific and technical information that
researchers on unclassified projects are accustomed to disseminat-
ing in specialized journals, in talks at meetings of professional socie-
ties, and through private discussions with colleagues.
Indeed, until comparatively recently, these export acts, versions
of which date back over thirty years,28 did not burden researchers
because the government employed them primarily to control the ex-
port of tangible items, such as equipment, commodities, devices, or
an), other "goods", as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code. 29
During the past five years or so, however, the government, taking
advantage of very broad language in the regulations, has attempted
to extend its export controls from well-defined categories of goods
to rather vaguely defined categories of scientific and technical infor-
mation, referred to as "technical data" in the export regulations.
For example, Section 379.1 of the EAR defines technical data which
may be subject to control as "information of any kind that can be
used, or adapted for use, in the design, production, manufacture,
utilization, or reconstruction of articles or materials." Section 379.1
also states that export of technical data, for purposes of the regula-
tions, may occur through "[o]ral exchanges of information in the
United States or abroad," or through "It]he application to situations
abroad of personal knowledge or technical experience acquired in
the United States." Similar definitions of controllable technical data
and regulation of their export are found in the ITAR.3-)
28. Greenstein, National Security Controls on Scientific Information, 23 JURIMETRLCS J. 50,
53 (1982).
29. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1978).
30. We are concentrating on the Export Administration and Arms Export Control
Acts because these are the statutes on which the government has been relying to control
information exports. This reliance stems from the fact that these statutes, unlike the
other export statutes referred to earlier, allow peacetime export controls on unclassified
information (rather than merely goods) without straining the statutory language. Thus
the Export Administration Act routinely distinguishes between "goods" and "teclinolo-
gies," both of which are controlled; 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(2) requires the Secretary
of Defense to develop a list of "militarily critical technologies," including "arrays of
design and manufacturing know-how . . . which, if exported, would permit a significant
advance in a military system" of the country receiving the export (emphasis added). [he




The licensing requirements and procedures under the ITAR and
EAR are extremely complexA' The issuance of export licenses, and
the difficulties involved in obtaining them, depend on the content of
the particular item and its putative destination. The most difficult
licenses to obtain concern potential exports to countries in the So-
viet bloc. Furthermore, under both the EAR 32 and the ITAR, 33 a
license to export technical data is not required if the technical data
are already available in published form. Both the EAR and the
ITAR reflect a belief that there is little to be gained by attempting to
restrict the dissemination of scientific and technical information that
is already widely available. Failure to heed the licensing require-
fense services", both of which are controlled. 22 U.S.C § 2794(4) defines "defense ser-
vice" to include "defense information (as defined in § 2403 of this title)"; 22 U.S.C.
§ 2403 defines "defense information" to include "any document, writing, sketch, photo-
graph, plan, model, specification, design, prototype, or other recorded or oral informa-
tion related to any defense article or defense service."
Language of this kind, permitting controls on the export of information, is not found,
nor is it expected, in, e.g., the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1983). On the
other hand, the government apparently possesses very broad powers to control exports
and imports, including information exports, under the section of the Trading With the
Enemy Act regulating financial transactions. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1983). In particular,
under the authority of this section, the government has promulgated regulations requir-
ing licenses for any transactions involving property in which Cuba, "or any national
thereof, has . . . any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect." Use of these
regulations to inhibit the travel of American citizens to Cuba, by forbidding them from
paying for any food, lodging, transportation, etc., while in Cuba has been upheld by the
Supreme Court. Regan v. Wald, 52 U.S.L.W. 4966 (June 26, 1984). The Court did not
even discuss the fact that the United States neither is, nor ever has been at war with
Cuba, although the past or present existence of an "at war" relationship is an explicit
requisite of the term "enemy" as defined in the Act. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1983). Appar-
ently this issue was settled long ago, by Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
361 F.2d 106, 111-112 (2d Cir. 1965); see United States v. Fernandez-Pertierra, 523 F.
Supp. 1135, 1138, no. 9 (S.D. Fla. 1981). The United States Customs, on the strength of
these same regulations, has seized publications sent from Cuba to residents of the
United States. ACLU, PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 15, FREE TRADE IN IDEAS (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ACLU REPORT]. The recently imposed embargo on trade with Nicaragua,
including imports and exports, apparently relies on the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1703. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1985, at A8, col. I.
31. A recent report by the Comptroller General discusses industry complaints that
United States export controls are "cumbersome, inconsistent and unnecessarily rigid."
The report points out that in fiscal year 1981 the Commerce Department processed 64,
518 export applications covering items controlled for national security reasons. How-
ever, Commerce carefully reviewed only 3,735 of these applications. In other words,
Commerce carefully reviewed fewer than one out of every seventeen export applications
it received. Largely on the basis of this simple fact alone, the report concludes that ex-
port licensing requirements are much broader and more restrictive than necessary to
protect national security. The report also notes that it costs both industry and the
United States millions of dollars per year to process these apparently unnecessary ex-
port license applications. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXPORT CONTROL REGULA-
TION COULD BE REDUCED WITHOUT AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY (1982) (indexed as
GAO/ID-82-14).
32. 15 C.F.R. § 379.3(a) (1984).
33. -22 C.F.R. § 125.11(a)(1) (1984).
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ments with respect to information which has not been previously
published, however, and which can be regarded as "technical data"
within the regulatory definitions, can result in very heavy penalties,
including a fine of $250,000 and imprisonment for ten years. 34
The typical researcher, unversed in the nuances of national se-
curity deliberations, finds it extremely difficult to decide whether
her research is subject to export controls. The lists of controlled
items published pursuant to the export acts are virtually impossible
to interpret confidently. For example, the Munitions List is hardly
more than a collection of broad headings, in effect a table of con-
tents, which is of little value in determining whether specific re-
search results are subject to control. Details concerning the items
on the aforementioned lists, which might make it possible to decide
whether specific research results are subject to controls, are likely to
be classified 3 5 and therefore not available to the baffled researcher.
For example, pursuant to the Export Administration Act, the gov-
ernment has published a list of militarily critical technologies (the
MCTL)36 whose associated technical data may be subject to con-
trol. 37 The details of the militarily critical technologies, however,
are classified. When first published, the unclassified version of the
34. 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(a)(ii) (1984); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (b)(l) (1983); 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778(c) 1983; 22 C.F.R. § 127.03 (1984). In general, the penalties for violating the
Export Administration Act are more severe than those for violating the Arms Export
Control Act.
35. PANEL ON SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON
SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC POLICY, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC
COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY, vol. 1, 18 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CORSON
REPORT]. A new NAS study, following up on the Corson Report, financed by five federal
agencies and a consortium of professional organizations, has very recently been an-
nounced. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1985, at A17, col. 1. Apparently this new study is in-
tended to determine the effects of export control policies on the competitiveness of
United States industry; the Corson Report concentrated on how export controls affected
the exchange of scientific information, especially in academia. 38 PHYSICS TODAY 48
(1985).
36. 45 Fed. Reg. 65,014 (1980); DEP'T OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, THE MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES LIST
(1984) [hereinafter cited as DOD MCTL].
37. Militarily critical technologies are defined by 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d)(2)(1983)
as follows:
The Secretary of Defense shall bear primary responsibility for developing a list of
militarily critical technologies. In developing such list, primary emphasis shall be
given to-
(A) arrays of design and manufacturing know-how,
(B) keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment, and
(C) goods accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, and mainte-
nance know-how
which are not possessed by countries to which exports are controlled under this
section and which, if exported, would permit a significant advance in a military
system of any such country.
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MCTL merely listed the critical technologies by name. 38 Under
each critical technology the government added "keystone hard-
ware", defined as the "unique hardware components that are neces-
sary for the effective development or application of" the various
militarily critical technologies. 39 A physicist would find it nearly im-
possible to perform a publishable experiment which did not use any
keystone hardware. For example, under "diagnostic technology" -
one of the hundreds of critical technologies listed - the keystone
hardware listed in 1980 include, inter alia: "streak cameras, neutron
detectors, gamma detectors, X-ray detectors, fast analog circuitry
fast oscilloscopes, computers, X-ray transmission equipment, spec-
troscopy equipment, magnetic field measuring equipment, interfer-
ometry equipment, and diagnostic lasers." 40 The newly published
unclassified MCTL is much more usefully detailed and imposes
fewer restrictions than the original list, but the total number of sub-
jects included remains forbiddingly large to the researcher hoping
to improve on previously published results by using the latest ad-
vances in experimental techniques. Were the export regulations to
be literally enforced, few such researchers working on unclassified
projects could feel confident about giving a paper at an interna-
tional conference without subjecting the paper to pre-publication
review.
II. Illustrative Applications of Export Controls
The first attempt to use the export acts to restrict the dissemina-
tion of scientific information, rather than to control the export of
goods, occurred only comparatively recently. During the waning
days of the Carter administration, the Commerce Department ab-
ruptly intervened in the planning of the International Conference
on Bubble Memory, organized by the American Vacuum Society and
scheduled to be held in Santa Barbara, California, in February 1980.
About a week before the conference was to open, the President of
the Vacuum Society received a letter from the Commerce Depart-
ment. The letter warned:
[PIresentations to be made at the Conference may fall within the scope
of Part 379 (Technical Data) of the U.S. Export Administration Regu-
lations. . . .You are invited to submit to the Office of Export Admin-
istration a request for an advisory letter so that we may make a
definitive determination as to what restrictions govern the subject mat-
38. 45 Fed. Reg. 65,014 (1980).
39. 45 Fed. Reg. 65,160 (1980).
40. DOD MCTL, supra note 36.
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ter of theConference. The request should include submission of cop-
ies of the presentations to be made, sources of the information
contained in the presentations, and whether the information is propri-
etary in nature or in the public domain. 4 1
Even if one ignores the fact that the letter was received only a
week before the Conference was scheduled to open, the fact remains
that the recipients of the letter did not have the information re-
quested by the Commerce Department. At scientific conferences,
people frequently speak without a prepared text. Even when a pa-
per has been written before the conference, it often is not submitted
to the conference chairman until the day of its presentation. It is
not possible, moreover, for conference organizers to anticipate how
a speaker will respond to questions; and it is difficult for conference
organizers to know if the information to be presented is in the pub-
lic domain. If conference organizers are to be held responsible for
improprieties by speakers, few will be willing to organize a confer-
ence - a task that often involves a great deal of work and very little
glory.
John Vossen, the Vacuum Society President, explained these real-
ities to the Commerce Department, but he was informed that unless
the papers received approval before the conference, invitations to
participants from the Eastern Bloc must be withdrawn. Failure to
comply with the Commerce Department's requirements would be
punishable by up to a $10,000 fine, ten years in prison, and an addi-
tional fine of five times the value of any equipment seen or
demonstrated.
Consequently, invitations to participants from the Soviet Bloc
were withdrawn, and the other foreign participants were required to
sign a letter of assurance that information obtained at the Confer-
ence would not be divulged to Eastern Bloc nationals. The Com-
merce Department was unpersuaded by the argument that requiring
a letter of assurance would make it awkward for American scientific
societies to invite foreign scientists to United States conferences and
by the warning that distinguished foreign scientists might refuse in-
vitations premised upon a Commerce-imposed censorship of their
future scientific associations. 42
41. Letter from K.N. Knowles, Director, Office of Export Administration, U.S. Dept.
of Commerce to Dr. J.L. Vossen (Feb. 14, 1980).
42. This material on the 1980 Bubble Memory Conference is based largely on pri-
vate communications with Dr. Vossen. Much of this story has been previously recounted





This interference with the planning of the Vacuum Society Bubble
Memory Conference was not an isolated incident; the government
has intervened in other scientific conferences, although infre-
quently. A particularly notorious intervention occurred in August
1982, at the International Congress of the Society of Photo-Optical
Instrumentation Engineers in San Diego, California. 4 3 Of 773 pa-
pers originally scheduled for presentation at the Congress, about
120 were withdrawn after warnings by the Pentagon that their deliv-
ery might violate export regulations. 4 4 Many of the withdrawn pa-
pers had, inexplicably, been contributed by the Defense
Department's own laboratories: it is difficult to quarrel with the
Pentagon's later decision to withdraw permission for their presenta-
tion. For example, it is astonishing that permission was originally
granted to the Naval Air Development Center to deliver a paper en-
titled "Reconnaissance in the F/A-18A" or to the Naval Ocean Sys-
tems Center for delivery of a paper "Advanced Automation for the
Battlefield." 4 5 On the other hand, the papers withdrawn at the be-
hest of the Pentagon included apparently non-military basic re-
search - for example, two papers on atmospheric infrared
emissions submitted by a Physics professor at the University of Mas-
sachusetts at Amherst. As did the organizers of the 1980 Vacuum
Society Conference, this professor received notice of objections to
his papers less than one week before the Congress was scheduled to
begin .4 6
Scientific conferences have not been the only forum in which the
federal government has relied on export controls to prevent the dis-
semination of unclassified research results. In December 1981, the
National Library of Medicine informed foreign distributors of MED-
LINE, a national computerized index of articles taken from some
3000 medical and biomedical journals, that they "should not allow
any person from a Communist country to have direct, on-line com-
puter access to the system, unless prior approval had been obtained
43. This Society's acronym caused the Conference to be widely referred to as the
SPIES conference. Perhaps this is what drew the government's attention to it.
44. Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of
Defense, Subject: SPIES Congress, 21-27 August 1982 (1982). Recently, April 1985, the
DOD again intervened in a SPIES conference; in this case, however, the DOD insisted
on the withdrawal of only about a dozen papers. Norman, Security Problems Plague Scien-
tific Meeting, 228 SCIENCE 471 (1985).
45. Memorandum for the Record, Major W. F. Saxe, Subject: SPIES Conference
(Aug. 30, 1982) [on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review.]
46. Letter from L.F. Cook to M. Goldhaber, President, American Physical Society
(Aug. 27, 1982). At the time, Cook was Chairman of the Department of Physics, Univer-
sity of Massachusetts at Amherst.
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from the Commerce Department's Office of Export
Administration. " 4 7
In addition, about four years ago, the State Department sent
many university science departments letters similar to the following
communication received by the Physics Department at the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh:
The Chinese scholar [who was named] at your institution is part of an
official US-China exchange program. . . The United States Govern-
ment is concerned that none of these programs involve the transfer of
technical data which is considered critical on export control or na-
tional security grounds. US law and regulations require that the De-
partment of State, together with the relevant US agencies, examine in
detail those programs which may involve the transfer of such technical
data.
The letter asked the university to complete a questionnaire that in-
cluded the following questions:
What professional trips might this student or scholar be taking?
What major subject areas will be involved in the scholar or student's
program?
Do you - the host professor - or your institution have any con-
tracts with industry or government organizations? If so, please list
them and indicate whether the foreign visitor will have any access to
contract activities. 48
The University of Pittsburgh Physics Department received this let-
ter in connection with five Chinese graduate students. It did not
complete the questionnaire in detail, but sent the State Department
a copy of the department's graduate brochure, along with the state-
ment that the department did not conduct classified research and
that all of its graduate students, domestic and foreign, were treated
alike. Many university departments made no attempt to comply with
the State Department's request. In one case, the State Department
asked the University of Minnesota to restrict a Chinese computer
science student "from any access to unpublished Government-
funded work"; the State Department also requested that his courses
47. ACLU REPORT, supra note 30, at A-37, quoting Marshall, Medical Data Bank: A
Security Risk?, 216 SCIENCE 831 (1982). MEDLINE is an on-line computerized data base
maintained by the National Library of Medicine, part of the National Institute of Health.
The National Institute of Health is one of the agencies of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services. According to Science, the Commerce Department feared that a
skilled computer operator, once having entered MEDLINE, might be able to jump from
this comparatively innocuous (from a national security standpoint) data base to more
sensitive computer files.
48. Letter from M. Sardinas, Country Officer, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department




involve only minimal applied research. Peter McGrath, president of
the university, responded:
We have all kinds of unpublished government funded research all over
the campus. Your proposal would restrict him from access to all of
it. . . . You ask for coursework with minimal involvement in applied
research; I don't know what you mean by minimal, and I have no idea
how you define applied research. . . . You ask to be informed prior
to any visits to any industrial or research facilities; I can only interpret
this to give us the choice of confining him to the student union, or
contacting you several times a day about his campus itinerary ...
Both in principle and in practice, the restrictions proposed in your let-
ter are inappropriate for an American university. . . Our mission is
teaching, research, and public service, and neither our faculty nor our
administrators were hired to implement government security
actions. 49
III. The Research Community's Reaction to Export Controls
The University of Minnesota's sharp response reflects a wide-
spread fear that the government is overreacting to reports circulated
by certain sectors of the defense and intelligence communities. Ac-
cording to these reports, the nation's security interests have been
seriously harmed by past technology transfers, especially to the So-
viet Union. The university research community was especially
frightened by Admiral Bobby Inman's 1982 speech at the annual
meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence, this country's largest organization of American scientists. Ad-
miral Inman, former Deputy Director of the C.I.A., argued for
stringent controls on the export of technical information. Accord-
ing to Inman:
[F]oreign intelligence services . . . are collecting all types of informa-
tion in the U.S. Specific data on technical subjects are high on the
wanted list of every major foreign intelligence service and for good
reasons. . . . In terms of harm to the national interests, it makes little
difference whether the data are copied from technical journals in a li-
brary or given away by a member of our society to an agent of a for-
eign power. . . . One sometimes hears the view that publication
should not be constrained because "the government has not made its
case," almost always referring to the absence of specific detail for pub-
lic consumption. This reasoning is circular and unreasonable. . ..
Specific details about why information must be protected are more
often than not even more sensitive than the basic technical informa-
tion itself. Publishing examples, reasons and associated details would
49. 23 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., No. 2, 1,10 (1981).
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certainly damage the nation's interests. Public review and discussion
of classified information which supports decisions is not feasible or
workable. 50
During the discussion that followed, Admiral Inman noted that
unless scientists controlled the "hemorrhage" of sensitive research
information, there would be a "tidal wave" of repressive legislation
aimed at controlling the publication and release of such
information. 5'
The assertion that the fact of prior technology transfers to the
Soviet Union warrants increased export controls on unclassified sci-
entific and technological research results has been examined care-
fully by a panel of the National Academy of Sciences, America's
most prestigious scientific organization. According to this panel:
While there has been extensive transfer of U.S. technology of direct
military relevance to the Soviet Union from a variety of sources, there
is a strong consensus that scientific communication, including that in-
volving the university community, appears to have been a very small
part of this transfer up to the present time.5 2
The vast majority of Soviet acquisitions of United States technol-
ogy are obtained through overt and covert intelligence activities,
such as legal and illegal purchases of American equipment. Accord-
ing to Admiral Inman, "of the acquisition of information of value to
the Soviets. . .[only] a small percentage comes from the direct
technical exchanges conducted by scientists and by students."5 3
However, Admiral Inman and others in the intelligence and defense
communities believe that "there is now a clear trend toward a
greater Soviet effort to acquire information about technologies from
universities and other research institutions"; 54 it is this new threat,
so the argument goes, that justifies broader application of export
controls.
The National Academy of Sciences panel concluded that it is not
yet possible to usefully evaluate the significance of this purported
50. Inman in Symposium, Striking a Balance: Scientific Freedom and National Security, at
the Annual Meeting AAAS, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 7, 1982); the full text of the talk has
been reprinted, AViATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH., Feb. 8, 1982, at 10 [hereinafter cited
as AAAS Symposium.]
51. Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1982, at AI0, col. 1. 18 ; Chalk, Security and Scientific Commu-
nication, 39 BULL. ATOM. SCIENrlSTS 19 (1983).
52. CORSON REPORT, supra note 35, at 17.
53. Impact of National Security Considerations on Science and Technology: Hearings Before the
Subcomms. on Science, Research and Technology and Investigations and Oversight of the House Com-
mittee on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1982) (testimony of Admiral
Inman) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].




new threat. According to its report, "a useful forecast can[not] be
made at present concerning the future proportion of leakage to the
Soviet bloc through scientific communication." 55
Because the intelligence and defense communities point to uni-
versity research as a major potential source of future leakage of
technology to the Soviet Union, and because university researchers
are less accustomed than their industrial counterparts to restrictions
on the dissemination of research results, this article has thus far con-
centrated on the reaction of the university community to the gov-
ernment's new focus on the enforcement of restrictions on the
export of technical data. Industrial researchers, unlike university re-
searchers, are commonly obliged to submit manuscripts to their
superiors for pre-publication review; such requirements are neces-
sary to ensure that information about patentable inventions and
trade secrets is not released. Because of these dissimilar traditions,
university researchers appear to have argued more forcefully against
export controls on technical data than have their industrial
counterparts.56
The industrial research community, however, is affected by, and
opposes, controls on the export of technical data. High-technology
companies with many international affiliates, such as IBM or RCA,
find such controls particularly obstructive; if read literally, the ex-
port regulations would prevent the free flow of information between
domestic and foreign branches within the same company. 57 During
the August 1984 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association
in Chicago, Daniel O'Neill,5 8 a panelist at a session entitled "Con-
trols on Scientific Information Exports: Have We Been Giving Away
the Store?", presented the views of private industry. He denounced
the government's use of export controls to limit transfers of techni-
cal data, claiming that the use of such export controls is a severe and
unnecessary barrier to the economic survival of high-technology
companies. Similar criticisms have been voiced by David Packard,
Chairman of the Board of the Hewlett-Packard Company and Dep-
uty Secretary of Defense under President Nixon:
I cannot resist the temptation to comment at this point on the grossly
misguided current proposal by our Defense Department to censor the
55. Id. at 25.
56. Cf. Gray, Technology Transfer at Issue: the Academic Viewpoint, IEEE SPECTRUM, May
1982; Wallich, Technology Transfer at Issue: the Industry Viewpoint, IEEE SPECTRUM, May
1982, at 69.
57. Wallich, supra note 56, at 70. See also supra note 35.
58. Mr. O'Neill is chairman of the ABA Section of Science and Technology's Gov-
ernment Policy and Regulation Division.
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publication of the results of basic research funded by the Department
at U.S. universities. They are . . . proposing to restrict technology
transfer between the United States divisions and foreign divisions of
international companies. I am quite certain that these proposals, if
carried out, will do considerable damage to the advancement of all
technology in the United States including technology useful for mili-
tary purposes. It will not seriously hamper the Soviets in their pro-
gress in technology for military equipment unless an impregnable
barrier can be placed around the Soviet Union and this, of course, is
impossible. To put the matter in plain English, the current effort of
the Defense Department to censor basic research in the United States
is simply stupid. 59
Joint research ventures involving the academy and private indus-
try increasingly include the imposition of patent and trade secret
restrictions on university research. 60 Many universities, including
Brown, M.I.T., Stanford, Carnegie-Mellon, and the University of
Texas, have accepted contracts from IBM and other large computer
companies that impose restrictions on the publication of research
results. 61 The University of Tulsa has participated in industry-sup-
ported research consortia that permit the sponsor to delay the pub-
lication of research results for up to two years. 62
The increasing willingness of universities to accept such con-
straints weakens university arguments against the government's im-
position of export controls on the results of scientific research, as
Admiral Inman pointed out in his 1982 talk to the AAAS. 6 3 There is
a genuine difference, however, between pre-publication require-
ments imposed by the government and those negotiated by univer-
sity and industry in their joint research ventures. Violation of the
former is punishable by criminal penalties, whereas breach of the
latter type of agreement can be punished only through imposition of
damages. Moreover, according to Robert M. Rosenzweig, President
of the Association of American Universities:
59. Packard, Speech at the IEEE Centennial Celebration, quoted in SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM
AND NATIONAL SECURITY, June 1984, at 4.
60. See, e.g., Smith, Industry-University Research Programs, 37 PHYsIcs TODAY 24 (1984).
Smith, Associate Provost and Vice President for Research at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, explains that at M.I.T., the industrial sponsor ofjoint university-industry
projects is granted a 30-day pre-publication review "so that the sponsor can guard
against inadvertent disclosure of proprietary information." Id. at 37.
61. N.Y. Times, Oct.16, 1984, at A1, col. 1.
62. Blais, Letter to the Editor, 37 PHYSicS TODAY 11 (1984).
63. AAAS Symposium, supra note 50. According to Admiral Inman, "scientists' blanket
claims of scientific freedom are somewhat disingenuous in light of the arrangements that
academicians routinely make with private, corporate sources of funding. For example,
academicians do not seem to have any serious difficulty with restrictions on publications




It is important to distinguish the kind of publication delay discussed
here [requested by industrial sponsors of university research] from
that which some government agencies have on occasion sought to im-
pose. To the extent that the purpose of review and delay is to deter-
mine whether a piece should be published, in whole or in part, it
should be unacceptable to a scientist and a university. However, de-
lays for the purpose of identifying patentable inventions and filing
them on a timely basis, delays in which the form and content of the
publication remain in the discretion of the author - such delays ought
not to cause difficulty.64
Compliance with export regulations can be very difficult for uni-
versities and for university researchers. The regulations are com-
plex and vague; more importantly, as President McGrath of the
University of Minnesota alluded, effective compliance with the ex-
port regulations would profoundly restrict the freedom of academi-
cians to discuss research with colleagues and students, a freedom
that lies at the heart of the modern American university and Ameri-
can academic tradition.
Because the export controls impose great burdens and uncertain-
ties on universities and university researchers, spokesmen for the
academic research community have suggested that the government
simply classify the information it does not want disseminated. 65 Re-
searchers who do not wish to have the dissemination of their re-
search findings restricted by the government could choose to work
only on unclassified projects. In fact, most universities will not ac-
cept classified research contracts on their main campuses because of
the incompatibility of classification and customary university free-
dom. The export regulations, due to their vagueness and broad
scope, are much more difficult to comply with than are restrictions
imposed by classification.
IV. Do Controls on Technical Data Exports Enhance
United States Security?
Even assuming that technology leakage to the Soviet Union
through scientific communication poses an increased threat, it re-
mains questionable whether stricter enforcement of controls on the
export of technical data will enhance the security of the United
States. More specifically, will the benefits from reduced technology
64. Rosenzweig, Research as Intellectual Property: Influences Within the University, 10 Sci.,
TECH., & HUMAN VALUES, 41, 48 (1985)
65. CORSON REPORT, supra note 35, at 52-53; see also Kolata, Attempts to Safeguard Tech-
nology Draw Fire, 212 SCIENCE 523 (1981).
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leakage outweigh the detrimental effects of export controls on this
nation's scientific research practices? The available facts do not re-
veal conclusive answers to these questions. Responses tend to be
based on individual experiences and prejudices, rather than on hard
data.
I do not believe that stricter controls on technical data will en-
hance our national security, but the contrary view is not clearly in-
consistent with available facts. Certainly, this contrary view is held
by many well-informed, intelligent persons who are dedicated to the
national welfare and who do not seem to harbor any hidden agenda.
Nonetheless, the arguments against increased export controls, espe-
cially with respect to university scientific research, are persuasive.
Research institutions of Western Europe and Japan are competitive
with those in the United States. Therefore, unless Japan and our
Western allies can be persuaded to withhold technical data from the
Soviets, 66 our export controls will limit our own export trade while
simultaneously hindering our scientists' attempts at fruitful collabo-
ration with their Western and Japanese colleagues. 67 American uni-
versity research, moreover, is dependent upon foreign graduate
students and post-doctoral students, due to the recent flight of
American undergraduates from mathematics, science and technol-
ogy. For instance, in 1983, 56 percent of all United States engineer-
ing Ph.D.'s were awarded to foreign students;68 already by 1980
one third of all science and engineering post-doctoral students em-
ployed in university research were foreign.69 Insistence that Ameri-
can university professors discontinue communication of technical
data to foreigners, therefore, would severely reduce the research
output of our universities.
Other arguments against export controls concern the alleged im-
practicality of attempting rigorously to enforce the export regula-
tions against universities.70 One telling point, made again and again
66. Or, as Packard put it, -[It will not work] unless an impregnable barrier can be
placed around the Soviet Union." Packard, supra note 59.
67. This assertion would hold true even if in the majority of cases the government
granted American scientists the export licenses they required to lawfully communicate
technical data to their foreign colleagues. The delays, awkwardnesses, red tape and po-
tential penalties of "export-controlled" collaborations would surely make such collabo-
rations unattractive to both American and foreign scientists.
68. Walsh, Total Doctorates Edge Up in Science, Engineering, 226 SCIENCE 815 (1984).
69. OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING,
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE REPORT ON UNIVERSITY RESPONSIVENESS TO NA-
TIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, 2-8 (Jan. 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as DSB REPORT].
70. For example, controlling the direct "export" of technical data to foreigners is
pointless if the same data are readily accessible in public and university libraries. Thus,




by opponents of increased export controls, 7' is that all available evi-
dence indicates that the Soviet Union's scientific research output has
been very seriously weakened by the stringent controls the U.S.S.R.
imposes on its scientific publications. The vast bulk of our basic re-
search is freely available to Soviet scientists, while Americans are
permitted to glimpse only that research which the KGB is willing to
release. Nevertheless, by most accepted criteria - numbers of
Nobel Prizes awarded, scientific papers published, significant inven-
tions, high-technology items, and new medicines discovered - the
United States continues to be far ahead of the Soviet Union scientifi-
cally, although in certain scientific subfields the Soviets compete fa-
vorably. There has been a recent quantitative study of the world-
wide impact of Soviet science, as measured by the number and na-
ture of journal citations to Soviet papers in the Science Citation Index,
a publication that monitors citations to scientific journals, domestic
and foreign, in 128 different scientific fields. In all, the impact of
Soviet journals in 1981 (the last year studied) was far below that of
United States journals, as well as that of the journals of most West-
ern nations.72
mechanisms to prevent the publication of controlled technical data in regularly circu-
lated unclassified American journals, magazines, newspapers, etc. . AAAS Symposium,
supra note 50. The magnitude of the bureaucratic effort implied by such "mechanisms"
is staggering. The Department of Commerce has pointed out that in 1978 approxi-
mately 1.5 million technical and scientific reports were published in the United States.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORTS OF TECHNICAL DATA BY PUBLICATION OR OTHER
MEANS OF PUBLIC DISSEMINATION, A STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 120 OF THE EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS OF 1977 (1978). As this report states:
Simply to read all the 1.5 million new technical and scientific reports that . . . are
[estimated to be] published each year would be extremely costly. Assuming that
one U.S. Government employee, earning about $33,000 a year, read approximately
six to seven scientific or technical reports each day and worked an average of 240
days a year, merely reading all the 1.5 million reports would cost the taxpayer some
$30 million. There would be additional costs for monitoring the numerous scien-
tific and technical meetings held each year, reviewing other possible public mecha-
nisms for disseminating technical data (such as newspapers, radio, and television),
and cataloging the results. It is evident that any monitoring system designed to
track the public availability of sensitive technical data would be extremely expen-
sive. . . . Even where efforts were concentrated on "critical technologies",
thousands of articles would remain to be reviewed each year. And this effort does
not take into account the other transfer mechanisms that would also need to be
monitored, such as public symposia, exhibits, and corporate reports.
Id. at 137-38. There is no reason to think that the number of published technical and
scientific reports in 1985, or the cost of review, would be significantly less than in 1978.
71. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 53, at 121-141 (testimony of Edward Gerjuoy) and at
87-97 (testimony of Robert Rosenzweig); Marshak, The Peril of Curbing Scientific Freedom,
PHYSICS TODAY,.Jan. 1984, at 192; Gerjuoy, supra note 42; N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at
A20 col. 1.
72. LaBrie and Sessler, The Impact on World Science of Soviet Science as Measured by Jour-
nal Citations in 1975 and 1981, University of California Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
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Further evidence that the openness of American society has en-
hanced, rather than hindered, American scientific superiority is the
flow of technical information from the United States to the Soviet
Union, eagerly fostered by the Soviets - the very reason the United
States government gives for the proposed export controls. No one
seriously suggests that American scientists would as eagerly seek to
acquire Soviet technical information as the Soviets seek American
technical information, were a more open scientific atmosphere to
prevail in the Soviet Union. Soviet refugees, admittedly not the
most objective sources, speak regularly of the poor scientific results
and low morale among researchers in the typical Soviet scientific
institute, consequences engendered by the pervasive restrictions on
communications. For example, Mark Popovsky, formerly a science
writer in the Soviet Union, has written that:
Secrecy is the main product of hundreds of Soviet research and de-
velopment institutes, and may be called the lifeblood of Soviet science.
The staff of an institute may turn out inferior products at huge ex-
pense, so slowly that the equipment is obsolete before it comes into
use, and nobody will turn a hair . . . but God help them if there had
been any security breach or leakage of information ....
A Moscow mathematician is credited with a much repeated saying:
"Secrecy in Soviet conditions is the one way of concealing our scien-
tists' shortcomings .... "
Dr. R. . . . is not a cynic, ... but he too is convinced that Russia
has lost the race with the West. . . since scholars and scientists cannot
work properly in an atmosphere of forced conformity and bureaucratic
supervision. 73
It is also worth mentioning that the opposition to increased export
controls includes scientists not often accused of being soft on the
Soviet threat to this nation, such as Edward Teller.74
A little-known story concerning the early history of the laser will
illustrate the point that the openness of our scientific communica-
tion is a national strength, not a weakness. The first paper to de-
scribe how a laser might be built was published in December 1958
by Arthur Schawlow and Charles Townes in the Physical Review, the
leading American journal of general physics. 75 At the time, the pa-
reprint (Mar. 10,1983), summarized in Holden, Russian Influence in Science Diminishing,
223 SCIENCE 1155 (1984).
73. M. POPOVSK¥, SCIENCE IN CHAINS 66, 70, 82 (1980).
74. See Ember, CHEM. AND ENG. NEWS, Apr. 5, 1982 at 10. Dr. Teller is the co-inven-
tor of the hydrogen bomb. He was one of the very few scientists to testify against J.
Robert Oppenheimer at the hearings which culminated in the revocation of Oppen-
heimer's security clearance. See also, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1981, at C4, col. 1.




per's authors, along with their colleagues at Bell Laboratories and at
Columbia University, thought that actual construction of a working
laser would be difficult, if not impossible. Schawlow, who later re-
ceived a Nobel Prize for inventing the laser, made a desultory at-
tempt to construct an operating laser, but soon abandoned the
effort and moved on to other projects.76 Much to his surprise,
therefore, by mid-1960 the development of an operating laser was
announced by a group with whom Schawlow had never been in con-
tact, a group housed at the Hughes Aircraft Company's research
laboratories in Malibu, California. Once the Hughes group had
shown that it could be done, other groups immediately set out with
assurance to construct lasers. Before the end of 1960, no fewer than
five different kinds of operating lasers had been demonstrated, one
developed by Schawlow himself at Bell Labs.
It is doubtful that dissemination of that first Schawlow-Townes
paper to foreign nations would have been prevented by any but the
most pervasive, all-encompassing regime of export controls: at the
time of publication there was little confidence that lasers could be
built and hardly an inkling of their capabilities.
Would restriction of the publication of the Schawlow-Townes pa-
per in 1958 have enhanced the security of the United States? Any
answer to this question is speculative, of course, but one is hard
pressed to answer in the affirmative. The rapid development by
American physicists of an operating laser, made possible by the wide
circulation of the Schawlow-Townes paper, enabled the United
States to take the lead in many important new technologies, includ-
ing retinal surgery and the manufacture of computer chips. Indeed,
the laser industry makes a substantial contribution to this country's
export trade. To be sure, lasers have military applications as well, of
which both the United States and the Soviet Union have taken ad-
vantage. It seems unlikely, however, that restrictions on the circula-
tion of the Schawlow-Townes paper would have better guaranteed
United States precedence in laser construction than uninhibited cir-
culation of the paper and reliance upon the rapid response of the
open scientific community to keep the United States in the forefront
of any useful research by-products. In fact, the most likely conse-
quence of a ban on the publication of the Schawlow-Townes paper
would have been the independent invention of the laser by a West-
76. See Schawlow, Masers and Lasers, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRON DEVICES, ED-
23, July 1976, at 773.
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ern European or Japanese scientist, who would then have published
the invention for both Soviet and American scientists to see.
V. A4re Export Controls Unconstitutional?
While there is reason to believe that it would be unwise from a
policy perspective to enforce strict technical data export controls,
such controls may be unconstitutional as well. I believe that the wis-
dom of the controls is the primary issue, because the courts are un-
likely to decide that export controls are unconstitutional exercises of
the government's obvious duty to protect the national security un-
less they question the wisdom of those controls. The foregoing is a
prediction, however, not a legal analysis, and it is far from being the
accepted view of legal scholars. The constitutionality of export con-
trols remains an open question.77
Insofar as they require a license before previously unpublished
technical data may be exported, the regulations constitute a system
of prior restraint on communication,7 8 which the First Amendment
was intended to prevent.79 It is not settled, however, that the com-
munication of technical data deserves full First Amendment protec-
tion. Technical data controlled under ITAR allegedly have only
military potential; in other words, they are not "dual use". There
seems no reason why controls on the dissemination of such techni-
cal data would threaten the values commonly believed to underlie
the free speech guarantee, such as the right of each citizen to receive
77. The following discussion of constitutionality relies heavily on the previously
cited papers by Cheh, supra note 8 and by Greenstein, supra note 8, as well as on Green-
stein, supra note 28 and Ferguson, Scientific Freedom, National Security, and the First Amend-
ment, 221 SCIENCE 620 (1983). Use has also been made of the following privately
communicated unpublished documents on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review: Relyea,
supra note 13; Olson, Re: Constitutionality of the Proposed Revision of the Technical
Data Provisions of the ITAR, Department ofJustice Memorandum (July 1, 1981); Olson,
Re: Export Administration Regulations, Department of Justice Memorandum (July 28,
1981); Meserve, National Security Restrictions on Scientific Communication: Publish
and Perish? (Apr. 20, 1983). The excellent analysis by Ferguson, National Security Con-
trols on Technological Knowledge: A Constitutional Perspectivie, 10 ScI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES
87 (1985) was published after the completion of this manuscript.
78. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraints, 20 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 655-56
(1955). See also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931): Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir.
1972).
79. According to Professor Tribe, "When the first amendment was approved by the
First Congress, it was undoubtedly intended to prevent government's imposition of any
system of prior restraints similar to the English licensing system under which nothing
could be printed without the approval of the state or church authorities." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 724 (1978). "Indeed a common view had been that the
first amendment was designed to forbid nothing but such restraints." Id. (citing Emer-




the socially useful information she needs to properly address impor-
tant policy issues.80 This assertion is consistent with the one case on
point, United States v. Edler,8 l which held the ITAR could be applied
to technical data "significantly and directly related to specific arti-
cles on the Munitions List."8' 2 Similarly, even "dual use" technical
data may not deserve full First Amendment protection; for instance
such data may be so closely related to commercial transactions, such
as the sale of a computer, as to merit only that lesser protection
afforded "commercial speech".8 3
Nevertheless, much dual use technical data are likely to be "basic
scientific research information", which is not classifiable under Pres-
ident Reagan's Executive Order unless clearly related to the na-
tional security. We do not really know how definitively to
distinguish basic from applied research, as was noted by the Presi-
dent of the University of Minnesota. Assume, however, that one can
make this distinction. Further, assume that the constitutional chal-
lenge is limited to licensing requirements on basic scientific re-
search results - for example, on the papers dealing with
atmospheric infrared emission which the Amherst Physics professor
was compelled to withdraw from the SPIES Congress. It is still not
clear that the communication of such basic scientific research results
deserves full First Amendment protection. The courts simply have
not confronted this issue.8 4 However, Edler85 can be read to mean
that "disembodied" scientific information - scientific information
that is only remotely or indirectly related to any controlled goods -
is beyond the reach of the export regulations.
Those authorities who have addressed the constitutionality of ex-
port controls maintain that basic scientific research results deserve
the same full measure of First Amendment protection as is given to
political expression. If the courts agree, the government will have
to demonstrate a compelling state interest in the export regulations
in order to justify the prior restraint imposed by export licensing
requirements. Such justification would probably require a showing
that grave and irreparable harm to the national security would be
80. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976); Ferguson, supra note 77.
81. 579 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1978).
82. Id. at 521.
83. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); see also L. TRIBE, supra
note 79, at 655-56.
84. See supra note 77; see also Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional
Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1978).
85. 579 F.2d 516.
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likely to result from failure to enforce pre-publication review.8 6 The
federal government would also have to show that there was no less
restrictive alternative means of protecting national security.
This standard of review would impose a very heavy burden on the
government.8 7 Nevertheless, I believe that if the government could
convince the present Supreme Court that pre-publication review of
basic scientific research is wise policy, then the government would
also succeed in convincing the Court that it had met its burden.
Some legal authorities, however, appear unwilling to make so cate-
gorical an assertion about the Court's probable attitude toward pre-
publication review. But legal authorities are often ignorant about
science and technology. The government should be able to argue
convincingly that basic research results can have important national
security implications that might not be recognized by the typical
American university researcher unacquainted with national defense
problems.
For instance, the government might point to the problem of
maintaining the invulnerability of our nuclear submarine fleet, upon
which is based much of our nuclear deterrent capability. A primary
component of this invulnerability is the fact that water, although it
looks transparent in a drinking glass or swimming pool, is actually
an effective absorber of visible light, so that detection of submarines
at distances greater than a few hundred yards requires the use of
sonar, a technique with many deficiencies.88 It is conceivable, how-
ever, that within the broad visible light absorption band of water
there are very narrow non-absorbing "windows", which heretofore
would not have been discovered because, for example, very narrow
band light sources such as lasers were unavailable. Therefore, the
86. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
87. The above-stated "compelling state interest" standard, with its subordinate re-
quirement that the government show it has no less restrictive means than pre-publica-
tion review of preventing grave and irreparable harm to the national security, is in effect
the standard Tribe enunciates for constitutional analysis of content-based restrictions on
communicative activity. L. TRIBE, supra note 79, at 602. The burden ofjustifying prior
restraint imposed on the government by this standard is no less than the "national se-
curity exception" burden the Near court was willing to allow the government. It is
doubtful that the present Supreme Court would impose a heavier burden than the Near
Court would accept. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 716-17. The Court in the Progressive
case relied on the Near national security exception in its opinion enjoining the magazine
from publishing an article describing how a hydrogen bomb is manufactured and assem-
bled, although the article's author had not received or made use of any formally classi-
fied documents. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis.
1979).
88. THE PHYSICS OF SOUND IN THE SEA, vol.8, 3, Summary Technical Report of Divi-




government might well argue, it is possible that a modern university
researcher, re-measuring the absorption properties of water with
the far more sensitive equipment available today, could happen
upon such a window. If a researcher quite innocently were to pub-
lish such experimental results, the consequences for our subma-
rines' invulnerability could be disastrous. Using lasers tuned to the
window frequency, the Soviets would be able to construct the
equivalent of powerful searchlights which, when placed on their own
submarines or on other underwater detectors, could locate and
track our submarines over distances of hundreds, perhaps even
thousands of miles.
It is likely that the government could produce enough illustra-
tions of this sort to convince the Supreme Court that there is a com-
pelling national security interest that would justify the imposition of
pre-publication review on basic research results to determine
whether an export license should be granted. The government also
should have little difficulty in convincing the Court that such review
- which should involve only minimal delays in publication for the
vast majority of papers 9 - would not be unduly restrictive, 90 par-
ticularly since universities have evidenced their willingness, in joint
research ventures with private industry, to tolerate the research de-
lays and disruptions caused by pre-publication review. Recently the
Department of Defense has implemented a policy of requiring many
of its research contractors to sign a contract clause accepting pre-
publication review, in part to avoid having to meet the compelling
89. The Department of Defense has suggested that a researcher could be allowed to
publish his results if the government makes no objections within 60 days of receipt of
the pre-publication manuscript. DSB REPORT, supra note 69, at Chapter 4.
90. Of course, publication of those very few "dangerous" basic research papers, e.g.,
the paper hypothesized earlier describing the discovery of windows in the visible light
absorption band of water, would have to be delayed for extended periods; otherwise
there would be no point to the entire expensive, bureaucracy-generating pre-publication
review effort. But the government would argue, now quite correctly in my opinion, that
- whatever might be the harm caused to American science by a comprehensive scheme
of pre-publication review - the extended withholding from publication of a very small
fraction of basic research papers would not significantly increase that harm. As for the
constitutionality of suppressing the publication of the few "dangerous" basic scientific
papers, this should be easier for the government to justify than pre-publication review of
all (or a wide class of) basic research papers; if the Court is willing to accept a significant
disruption of American science on the basis of hypothetical illustrations of dangerous
research results, then the Court should be willing to accept the much more minor dis-
ruption stemming from witholding publication of just a few papers, where this latter
disruption rests on actual (not hypothesized) identifiably dangerous research results. In
fact, if the national security implications indeed can be recognized at the basic research
stage (as was not possible with the laser, for example) the government should be able to
justify classification of those basic research results under the Reagan Executive Order,
assuming that the research has been performed with government funds.
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state interest standard in ajudicial proceeding.9' There has been as
yet no court test of pre-publication review provisions for federal
contractors. I believe the lesson of Snepp v. United States9 2 is that the
Burger Supreme Court will uphold contractually agreed-upon pre-
publication review in the context of the government's assertion that
national security interests are involved. 93 Again, however, this view
is more categorical than that which some specialists on the legalities
of technical data controls have been willing to take. 94
To summarize, I believe that if the Supreme Court is convinced
export controls represent wise government policy, then the Court
will be willing and able to uphold even those features of export con-
trols which impose prior restraints on basic research publication,
without unduly stretching the presently accepted compelling state
interest standard for the constitutionality of content-based restric-
tions on the freedom to communicate.
VI. Reconciliation of Opposing Export Control Views
Despite the wide differences in outlook between academic re-
searchers like Peter McGrath and defense specialists like Admiral
Inman, a reconciliation of their views apparently is possible. A re-
cent article by David Wilson describes at length how such a compro-
mise has developed. 9 5
91. DSB REPORT, supra note 69, at 4-1 to 4-11. The Report recommends that many
research contractors be explicitly limited to employing only U.S. citizens or permanent
immigrant aliens, and further recommends that other federal agencies supporting re-
search be urged to negotiate similar contracts. See also Greenstein, supra note 8.
92. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
93. Snepp was a former CIA employee. When he accepted employment he signed
an agreement promising not to publish "any information or material relating to the
Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of
[his] employment. . . without specific prior approval by the agency." This was part of a
general agreement not to disclose classified material related to the Agency without its
authorization. Id. at 508. Snepp published a book about the CIA without asking for a
pre-publication review. The government conceded that Snepp's book divulged no clas-
sified intelligence. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, declaring that Snepp had
breached a voluntarily entered-into contract, imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's
proceeds from his book and enjoined Snepp from publishing without pre-publication
review. On this basis, I believe the Court would uphold a university professor's volunta-
rily entered-into contract to submit his research results for pre-publication review in
return for receiving governmental research support. A professor, employed by a univer-
sity, and not dependent on the government for his salary, hardly has more equitable
claims than did Snepp, who when hired had to either accept the government's terms or
find another job.
94. Greenstein, supra note 28. Ferguson, however, appears to agree that Snepp sug-
gests that the Supreme Court will uphold pre-publication review of federally supported
basic research. Supra note 77.





In early 1982, Richard DeLauer, then Undersecretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering, commissioned what became known
as the DOD-University Forum, a group consisting of university pres-
idents and Department of Defense ("DOD") officials. A prime ob-
jective of the Forum was the development of export control policies
acceptable to both the DOD and the academy; to this end a "Work-
ing Group on Export Controls" was formed. The Group's delibera-
tions rested heavily on the National Academy of Sciences' previously
released Corson Report, which had been co-sponsored by Dr.
DeLauer. 96
As described by Dr. Wilson,9 7 co-chairman of the working group,
DOD officials ultimately accepted the view of the academic commu-
nity that strict controls on the dissemination of unclassifiable basic
research would not be the best way to serve this nation's security
needs. This conclusion was expressed in the following statement
issued in June 1984:
It is the policy of this administration that the mechanism for control of
fundamental research in science and engineering at universities and
federal laboratories is classification. Each federal government agency
is responsible for: a) determining whether classification is appropriate
prior to the award of a research grant or contract and, if so, control-
ling the research results through standard classification procedures; b)
periodically reviewing all research grants or contracts for potential
classification. No restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or re-
porting of research that has not received national security
classification.98
This DOD statement uses the terminology "fundamental re-
search" rather than "basic research," but it fails to define the "fun-
damental research" category to which the classification procedures
apply. DeLauer resolved this ambiguity in a memorandum issued
October 1, 1984. 99 This memorandum makes clear that "funda-
mental research" means research supported by DOD's 6.1 budget
category, the category commonly referred to as basic research. The
memorandum further states that "unclassified research performed
on campus at a university and supported by 6.2 funding (the budget
category corresponding to applied research) shall with rare excep-
tions be considered fundamental and therefore exempt from restric-
tions." Moreover, it has been reported that the White House is
considering requiring all federal agencies to follow DOD's June
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. See also Walsh, DOD Springs Surprise on Secrecy Rules, 224 SCIENCE 1081 (1984).
99. 226 SCIENCE 418 (1984).
473
Yale Law & Policy Review
1984 policy.it °
These developments are consistent with recent changes involving
the EAR and the ITAR. A proposed revision of the EAR that would
have greatly increased export controls on university science was
leaked in February 1984. This proposed revision would, for exam-
ple, have explicitly required a university professor to obtain an ex-
port license before delivering lectures containing technical data in a
regular university course attended by foreign students. Present reg-
ulations impose no such requirement. The February 1984 draft
EAR seems to have been quietly dropped, however, after prompt-
ing sharp objections from the academic community.
An October 10, 1984 draft of a revised section 379.3 of the EAR,
specifying the technical data that may be exported without an export
license, appears to impose considerably fewer restrictions on the ex-
port of university research than the language of the present EAR.
Indeed, the language in this draft, if retained in the final version,
would greatly alleviate the uncertainty confronting university re-
searchers attempting to comply with the Export Administration
Act.' 0 1 Similarly, a recent revision of the ITAR10 2 appears at first
glance to be not significantly stricter than before, although certain
definitions - those of "technical data" and "export" - have been
modified somewhat from the corresponding definitions in the previ-
ous ITAR. 103
On the other hand, the October draft of EAR section 379.3 ex-
plicitly withholds permission to export without applying for a li-
cense from university researchers funded by the U.S. government
when "specific national security controls . . . are agreed on in the
funding instrument to protect information resulting from the re-
search." Examples of controls include:
prepublication review by the Government, with or without right to
withhold permission for publication; restrictions on pre-publication
100. Id.
101. According to EAR draft § 379.3, titled "Technical Data Available to All Desti-
nations," unrestricted export is permitted, inter alia, of "information resulting from fun-
damental research." "Fundamental research" is defined as basic and applied research in
science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared
broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and
from industrial development, design, production, and production utilization, the results
of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or security reasons. Moreover, this
draft regulation explicitly states, "Research conducted by scientists or engineers work-
ing for a university normally will be considered fundamental research." Draft EAR
§ 379.3 (Oct. 10, 1984). For a summary and analysis of this draft regulation, see SCIEN-
TIFiC FREEDOM AND NATIONAL SECURITY, Dec. 1984, at 2.
102. 49 Fed. Reg. 47,681 (1984).




dissemination of information to noncitizens or other categories of per-
sons; or restrictions on participation of non-citizens or other catego-
ries of persons in the research. 10 4
Evidently the authors of the newly drafted EAR section 379.3,
though nominally removing export controls on the bulk of univer-
sity research, expect that much federally supported university re-
search (and therefore, a large portion of all university basic
research)' 0 5 will remain subject to export controls via contractual
provisions which the researcher will have to accept in order to re-
ceive federal funding.
However, if the DOD's June 1984 policy were adopted by all fed-
eral agencies, then no academic conducting unclassified basic re-
search with federal funds need fear that dissemination of previously
unpublished results to foreign scientists would violate the export
regulations. Once the contracting agency had decided not to class-
ify the research, the scientist would not, for example, need to pore
over the arcane contents of the militarily critical technologies list,
nor worry that the government might force her to withdraw at the
last moment a paper scheduled for delivery at a foreign scientific
conference. In other words, the DOD policy places on the govern-
ment, not on the academic, the responsibility for deciding whether
research results are sensitive enough to require export licenses or
other restrictions. In accepting this responsibility, the authors of
that policy presumably agreed with the university research commu-
nity's contention that pre-publication review of all federally sup-
ported basic research would turn up far too few publications
meriting export controls to justify the attendant adverse effects on
science in the United States.
The logic underlying this immediately preceding assertion be-
comes more apparent upon reconsideration of the previously de-
scribed example concerning the absorption of visible light by water.
It is extremely unlikely that a previously undiscovered narrow spec-
tral window exists in water;' 0 6 thus, research on the absorptive
properties of water is unlikely ever to affect national security by ren-
dering submarines vulnerable to underwater detection. The possi-
104. See supra note 101.
105. NAT'L SCI. FOUNDATION DIVISION OF SCIENCE RESOURCE STUDIES,EARLY RELEASE
OF SUMMARY STATISTICS ON ACADEMIC SCIENCE/ENGINEERING RESOURCES, Table 1 (Nov.
1984).
106. In fact, foreign researchers have recently sought, unsuccessfully, light propaga-
tion windows in sea water. Cariou and Lotrian, Transmission Characteristics of a Pulsed Laser
Beam in Natural Sea-Water: Determination of the Attenuation Coefficients in the 415 - 660 nm
Spectral Range, 15J. PHYS. D. APPL. PHYS. 1873 (1982).
475
Yale Law & Policy Review
bility of constructing this hypothetical, and of other equally unlikely
scenarios illustrating the potential military applications of basic re-
search results which might be obtained on normally unclassified re-
search projects, stems from the profound dependence of modern
military technology on the sciences. The fact that a basic research
outcome whose publication would be harmful to our national secur-
ity is conceivable does not mean the outcome is probable. Corre-
spondingly, an intrusive regulation of basic science which rests on
fear of remotely conceivable scenarios has little likelihood of en-
hancing the national security. In fact, as the early history of the la-
ser illustrates, military applications of basic research are much more
likely to evolve from research results whose military implications are
not immediately appreciated than from highly improbable discover-
ies having immediately recognizable military implications. To sig-
nificantly reduce the chance that the Soviet military establishment
will eventually profit from our published research, our government
would have to emulate the Soviet Union and restrict the export of
most of the nation's basic research; pre-publication review of all ba-
sic research results, with export controls on the small fraction of
proposed publications whose military implications are immediately
recognizable, would not be effective, even if constitutional.
VII. The Future of Export Controls
The June 1984 DOD policy statement pertains only to federally
supported research. Although the government's share of national
expenditures on basic research has steadily increased in recent
years, 0 7 much basic research receives no federal funding. For such
projects, the responsibility for deciding whether research results
may be lawfully disseminated appears to remain with the researcher,
even if the research is unclassified. Moreover, as Professor Wilson
points out, neither the EAR nor the ITAR provides a blanket ex-
emption from licensing requirements to basic researchers working
on unclassified projects supported by federal funds.' 08 Until the
June 1984 DOD policy on basic research is explicitly incorporated
into the EAR and ITAR, even federally supported unclassified basic
research results will remain subject to export controls in principle,
though the present trends in the EAR and ITAR suggest the gov-
107. See supra note 105.
108. See supra note 95. The draft EAR § 379.3, but not the newly promulgated
ITAR,does give such blanket exemption to a federally supported basic researcher who




ernment presently would not require licenses for such research.
These uncertainties in the scope of the June 1984 policy statement
may account for the recent exclusion of foreign nationals from some
or all sessions at recent American scientific conferences. 0 9 The ex-
clusions are, at the very least, examples of the chilling effect on sci-
entific interchange which critics have warned will result from
restrictive export controls.
Other recent developments at DOD and the Commerce Depart-
ment reflect a more hospitable attitude toward restrictions. Under a
new DOD directive, DOD may require federal contractors to with-
hold from public disclosure unclassified technical data "that disclose
critical technology with military or space application"; 10 the direc-
tive makes no reference to the June 1984 policy statement, or to
DOD's 6.1 budget category. The authority for the new directive is
an amendment to the 1984 DOD Authorization Act which permits
the Secretary of Defense to:
withhold from public disclosure, notwithstanding any other provision
of law, any technical data with military or space application in the pos-
session of, or under the control of, the Department of Defense, if such
data may not be exported lawfully without an approval, authorization,
or license under the Export Administration Act or the Arms Export
Control Act. " I1
The broad language of this amendment, taken together with its im-
plementation in the new DOD directive, extends the reach of export
controls to technical data transfers within the United States to
109. Norman, Mixed Signals on Export Controls, 226 SCIENCE 1295 (1984); SCIENTIFIC
FREEDOM AND NATIONAL SECURITY, Mar. 1985, at 3. These conferences include those of
the American Astronautical Society (October 1984), the Society for the Advancement of
Material and Process Engineering (October 1984), the Society of Manufacturing Engi-
neers (January 1985), and again, the SPIES Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation
Engineers (April 1985), where the restricted sessions were held at DOD insistence. Nor-
man, Security Problems Plague Scientific Meeting, 228 SCIENCE 471 (1985). It is likely that
these conferences concentrated on applied rather than basic research. But as the highly
applied 1982 SPIES Congress, discussed earlier see supra notes 43-46, demonstrates, it is
also likely that the restricted sessions at these conferences included papers on seemingly
non-military basic research.
110. 49 Fed. Reg. 48,040 (1984). Another recent DOD directive sets up mecha-
nisms for restricting access to this unclassified technical data. All DOD-generated docu-
ments, including those produced by DOD contractors, must be marked with one of
seven specified "Distribution Statements." For instance, Distribution D reads: "Distri-
bution [is] authorized to the Department of Defense and DOD contractors only (fill in
reason) (date of determination). Other requests shall be referred to (insert controlling
DOD office)." DOD Directive No. 5230.24, Distribution Statements on Technical Documents,
3-3 (Nov. 20, 1984). See also SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM AND NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note
101, at 6-7.
111. 10 U.S.C.A. § 140(c) (West Supp. 1984).
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American citizens, even though the Export Acts themselves only re-
strict technical data transfers to foreign nationals.
Furthermore, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige, in a re-
cent memorandum to various government officials, including the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has advocated wider
use of export controls.11 2 Secretary Baldrige, echoing Admiral In-
man's phrase about the "hemorrhage" of research information to
our adversaries,11 3 proposed "new legislation, new Executive Or-
ders, and coordinated government-wide regulations" to limit the
availability of unclassified documents now made public by the Com-
merce Department's National Technical Information Service."14
One further development may also portend stricter regulation. In
January 1985, DeLauer, the principal proponent of the June 1984
policy," 1 5 resigned from his position at DOD and returned to private
life."t 6 Opposition to the June 1984 policy statement, bitter at the
time,"17 certainly has not ended." 8 In any event, given the Reagan
Administration's past efforts to preserve government secrecy, 19 it is
clear that the final chapter on the control of scientific information
exports remains to be written. 2 0
112. Norman, Commerce Secretary Wants Technical Data Restricted, 227 SCIENCE 1182
(1985).
113. See supra note 50 and the quotations therein.
114. According to Science, supra note 112, the National Technical Information Service
functions as a central clearinghouse to which government agencies send their unclassi-
fied documents for public distribution.
115. Wilson, supra note 95. See also Norman, DeLauer Questions DOD Censorship, 224
SCIENCE 471 (1984).
116. Smith, Pentagon Decision-Making Comes Under Fire, 227 SCIENCE 32 (1985).
117. Wilson, supra note 95. See also N.Y. Times, May 3, 1984, at B14, col. 3.
118. N.Y. Times, supra note 117. Vice Admiral R. A. Miller, Vice Chief of Naval
Materiel, reportedly has criticized four senior Navy civilian employees for participating
in radar courses at the George Washington University school of continuing education,
despite the absence of any indication that the courses covered anything but unclassified
radar fundamentals. 224 SCIENCE 1409 (1984).
119. See, e.g. D. DEMAC, KEEPING AMERICA UNINFORMED: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN
THE 1980's (1984); 128 CONG. REC. H18 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1982) (statement of Rep.
George Brown); ACLU REPORT, supra note 30; Letter from F. C. Conahan, Director,
National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, to
the Honorable Jack Brooks, Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, U.S.
House of Representatives, concerning Polygraph and Prepublication Review Policies of
Federal Agencies (June 11, 1984).
120. The writer has attempted to ensure, but of course cannot guarantee, that this
paper is current on the status of technical data export controls as of April 1, 1985, when
his final revision of the piece was completed and delivered to the Yale Law & Policy Re-
view. A few notes referring to events and sources after April 1, 1985 have been added in
proof.
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